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I. Introduction
One of the most prominent movements of the last decade is ‘Effective Altruism’ (EA). EA is both a philosophy and a movement. As Peter Singer, one of the founding fathers of EA, tells us, it “is based on a 
very simple idea: we should do the most we can.”1 Similarly, along with William 
McAskill, another founding father of EA, they write that EA “is a growing 
1 Peter Singer, The Most Good You Can Do: How Effective Altruism Is Changing Ideas About 
Living Ethically (New Haven, NY, and London: Yale University, 2015), vii.
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community based around the idea of aiming to do the most good one can.”2 
The most good is construed as being charitable to those who need help to save 
their lives. Charity is construed mainly in monetary terms, in money. Donating 
money to charities supposedly saves lives around the world and, thus, ends up 
being how one can do “the most good.” Donating to charities that can provide 
a proven record that they save or that they have the potential of saving the 
most lives possible is how one does “the most good” effectively. 
EA has received a lot of attention and has generated a lot of discussion 
which takes place in philosophical journals, newspapers, and on-line in various 
forums and blogs.3 The main criticism on EA is that by donating to charities EA 
leaves fundamental moral issues such as global poverty and injustice intact. 
EA arguably does not promote radical institutional change which could lead 
to an ultimate eradication of the problems that may endanger people’s lives in 
the first place. Such criticism, however, is on the performative or the empirical 
aspect of the movement and not so much on its philosophical foundation. 
That is, criticism on EA focuses on evaluating the practical realisation of 
its mandates with little, if any, evaluation on its philosophical foundation. 
Essentially, it is a consequentialist critique insofar as it focuses on what its 
results are. My aim in this paper is to extend the critique but from a different 
angle, that is, by going back to its philosophical underpinnings. I would like 
to show how the problems that have been noted in the recent criticism are all 
reflected in the foundational argumentation for EA.
II. Funding the foundation of EA
EA is a rather recent movement if we go by the name of it. Before exploring 
EA from the writings of the community, let us reflect for a bit on the title. By 
its title, EA introduces us to an altruism that is different from what altruism is. 
The adjective “effective” allows us the possibility to conceive that there are 
other ways of being altruistic which are not ‘effective.’ Yet, EA purports to 
be precisely that. There is a difference in being altruistic and being altruistic 
effectively. If altruism is simply about doing good, then EA is about “doing 
good better” or “the most good that you can do” as the supplementary 
titles of the books of McAskill and Singer announce respectively. But such 
“adjectivation” adjects, in other words adds or appends4 to altruism certain 
conditions. These conditions are questioned in this paper. 
2 Peter Singer, and William MacAskill, “Introduction,” in The Effective Altruism Handbook, ed. 
Ryan Carey, viii-xvii (Scotts Valley, CA: CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, 2015), viii. 
3 For an extensive recent literature review see Brian Berkey, “The Institutional Critique of 
Effective Altruism,” Utilitas 30, no. 2 (2018): 1-29.  
4 For the various meanings of “adject” see “Adject,” Oxford English Dictionary, accessed September 
15, 2020, https://www.oed.com/search?searchType=dictionary&q=adject&_searchBtn=Search.
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As it has already been noted, EA is both a philosophy and a movement. This 
“raises the sticky question of how books that seek to popularize EA […] should 
be evaluated.”5 In this paper, it is this sticky question that is problematised. 
We can go about reflecting on the philosophy of EA, or on the movement 
itself, or on the way the philosophy becomes praxis; in other words, how the 
theory is materialised into action. Whatever one opts to do, what the above 
comment from Jennifer Rubenstein suggests is of crucial importance because 
it asks us to apply the principle question of EA on EA itself. That is, we can 
ask: How good or how effective is EA? But, most importantly for our purposes 
here, we can ask: How altruistic is EA? In this paper, I would like to risk the 
hypothesis that EA presupposes the sacrifice of those that it purports to save. 
With EA, the poor or those in need of being saved from the conditions of 
poverty are literally and figuratively stuck, shackled in their poverty. To risk 
an analogy, if the condition of a business is its original funding, its monetary 
foundation, then the sacrifice of those found in current need come to be the 
funding of EA which allows the business of capitalism to keep working.6 
In the The Effective Altruism Handbook Singer and MacAskill tell us 
about the idea of EA and where it comes from. We read that the idea “arose 
naturally out of recent developments in economics, psychology and moral 
philosophy.”7 We focus on the philosophy:
The development of moral arguments, by Peter Singer and 
others, in favor of there being a duty to use a proportion of one’s 
resources to fight global poverty, and in favor of an “expanded 
moral circle” that gives moral weight to distant strangers, future 
people and nonhuman animals.8
While it is difficult to trace in their writings who the ‘others’ are, those others 
who have developed similar moral arguments, we shall first focus on Singer’s 
philosophical argument on there being a duty to use a proportion of one’s 
resources in order to be altruistic.9 This choice is important and needs a bit 
5 Jennifer C. Rubenstein, “The Lessons of Effective Altruism,” Ethics & International Affairs 30, 
no. 4 (2016): 516. My emphasis. 
6 See also Amia Srinivasan, “Stop the Robot Apocalypse,” rewiew on Doing Good Better: 
Effective Altruism and a Radical New Way to Make a Difference, by William MacAskill, The 
London Review of Books 37, no. 18 (2015): 3-6; 
7 Singer, and MacAskill, “Introduction,” xii.
8 Ibid., xiii.
9 From the point of view of the history of philosophy, this idea of giving due proportions can 
be found in the writings of Marcel Mauss based on his ethnological research. Marcel Mauss, 
The Gift: The Form and Reason for Exchange, trans. W. D. Halls (London: Routledge, 1954). 
However, in Mauss the giving in due proportions is not represented in terms of a system 
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of clarification. By starting with Singer’s widely discussed paper, I am not 
claiming, as some might hastily read, that the plausibility of EA depends 
exhaustively on the plausibility of Singer’s moral arguments advanced in his 
1972 paper. After all, one might be convinced to be an effective altruist 
(EA) without ever having read (t)his paper. They may rest on the development 
of (the) moral arguments by Peter Singer and others. But the development 
requires a seed. This seed may not be visible in what has developed – the 
acorn seed is not visible from the outside. In his writings, Singer identifies the 
seed of EA in his argument advanced in his 1972 paper.10 Based on the textual 
evidence, there is no other philosophical argument to be found as a seed. In 
this paper, the focus is to philosophically explore such founding or fathering, 
that is, begetting argument of or for EA.11 
regulated by capitalist principles but it is a giving of reciprocity. Exchange is the condition of 
this primal form of economy which Mauss identifies as the first form of collective economy but 
it does not lead to accumulation of capital or differences in property. It would be interesting 
to interrogate how this research has not attracted attention from the community of EA but 
this is not the purpose of this paper. 
10 In both his books, Singer starts with the argument of the 1972 paper. In his contribution in 
The Effective Altruism Handbook the same appeal is made. In his recent attempt to defend his 
moral position from various critics he cites his own 1972 paper with the following: “Given the 
present conditions in many parts of the world […] it does follow from my argument that we 
ought, morally, to be working full time to relieve great suffering of the sort that occurs as a 
result of famine or other disasters.” Peter Singer, “The Most Good You Can Do: A Response 
to the Commentaries,” Journal of Global Ethics 12, no. 2 (2016): 163. Unless we completely 
disregard the textual evidence, the foundational philosophical arguments which condition the 
development of EA are found in the 1972 paper. 
11 In a recent anthology on EA, MacAskill defines EA but he does not offer a moral argument as 
a motivating reason to follow EA Cf. Hilary Greaves, and Theron Pummer, Effective Altruism: 
Philosophical Issues (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019). He just rephrases the main ideas 
of a consequentialist thinking – I am saying consequentialist and not utilitarian as Gray, and 
Frazer do. Cf. John Gray, “How & How Not to Be Good,” review of The Most Good You 
Can Do: How Effective Altruism Is Changing Ideas About Living Ethically, by Peter Singer, The 
New York Review of Books, May 21, 2015, https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2015/05/21/
how-and-how-not-to-be-good/; Giles Fraser, “It’s Called Effective Altruism – But is it Really 
the Best Way to Do Good?” The Guardian, September 23, 2017, https://www.theguardian.
com/money/belief/2017/nov/23/its-called-effective-altruism-but-is-it-really-the-best-way-to-
do-good. In utilitarianism the most you can do is cashed out in terms of happiness whereas a 
consequentialist can, theoretically, assume any kind of standard of rightness to maximise. As 
in his monograph, MacAskill rests on most people’s intuition on making a difference and doing 
good assuming a pro tanto reason. But whence and whither such intuition or reason? One might 
interpret it as an intuition pointing to a universal truth. Cf. William. D. Ross, The Right and 
the Good (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1930), or as a hard-wired neural mechanism, cf. 
Donald W. Pfaff, The Altruistic Brain: How We Are Naturally Good (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2015); Iraklis Ioannidis, “The Altruistic Brain,” Review of The Altruistic Brain: How We 
Are Naturally Good, by Donald W. Pfaff, Metapsychology Online Reviews 19, no. 27 (2015): 
https://metapsychology.net/index.php/book-review/the-altruistic-brain/, or one may interpret 
it as a deep-seated habit – cf. Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals and Ecce Homo, 
trans. Walter Kauffmann (New York: Random House, 1967) –, a habit like the one MacAskill 
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III. Saving a child
Singer’s 1972 article starts with the following: “As I write this, in November 
1971, people are dying in East Bengal from lack of food, shelter and medical 
care.”12 Whether used literally or figuratively, the death of the Other seems 
to have motivated Singer to explore whether or not we have a duty to help 
and save those who are dying. But where does this duty come from?
Singer says that if it is in our power to act in such a way as to prevent 
something bad from happening; and if this prevention would not entail our 
sacrificing something of comparable importance, then we have to act in that 
way. This principle follows from an “assumption,” that is, “that suffering and 
death from lack of food, shelter, and medical care are bad.”13 At this instance, 
Singer does not say that death is bad but qualifies badness as a particular kind 
of death. This qualification opens up the possibility of asking the reason of 
such a particular death. If this death comes from ‘lack,’ then at some point 
we need to face this lack and ask how it comes about. Is it a natural lack? But 
before we proceed in this path let us follow Singer in his writing. 
As Singer avows, if one does not believe that such suffering and death 
are bad, then his reasoning will not appeal to them and they “need read no 
further.”14 For those (of us) who share the assumption that Singer articulates 
would mean that the principle of altruism stated above follows logically. To 
make this evident, Singer provides us with an imaginative scenario or what 
is usually called a thought experiment. We shall quote the scenario as it has 
been written by Singer to avoid missing any important details:
[…] if I am walking past a shallow pond and see a child drowning 
in it, I ought to wade in and pull the child out. This will mean 
getting my clothes muddy, but this is insignificant, while the 
death of the child would presumably be a very bad thing.15 
Like most thought experiments, Singer’s experiment aims to accelerate our 
understanding16 by focusing closely only on what is relevant in making the 
asks us to pick up in being effectively altruistic at the end of his monograph: “1. Establish a 
Habit of Regular Giving.” See William M. MacAskill, Doing Good Better: Effective Altruism and 
a Radical New Way to Make a Difference (London: Guardian Faber, 2015), 165; 
12 Peter Singer, “Famine, Affluence, and Morality,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 1, no. 3 (1972): 
229.
13 Ibid., 231. 
14 Ibid. This exclusion is interesting and raises questions to what effective altruists profess as a 
need for a global ethics, but we cannot take up this thread here. 
15 Ibid. 
16 For an extensive description of thought experiments and their development see, James 
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argument. For this acceleration, however, there is a cost: historical sacrifice.17 
For instance, we are not given any further information concerning how we 
ended up passing a shallow pond. Yet, we ought to, that is, we have a duty, 
to wade in and pull the drowning child out. If we assume that death is bad 
and that no death, or something of comparable moral importance, will come 
to us by preventing it, then we have to do it. The comparison is whether to 
save a drowning child or get muddy. The death of the drowning child would 
be, presumably, much worse than the impairment of some clothing. In other 
words, the issue is about value. The value of life weighs or is worth more than 
the value of clothing. The animate is more valuable than the inanimate. Most 
people would, perhaps, agree that saving the child would be the right thing 
to do – regardless of whether such a statement could be motivated by some 
sort of social desirability or cultural mandate. 
If we feel authentically that we ought to save this child, Singer tells 
us, then there is no reason why we should not feel the same way for those 
suffering in East Bengal or any other distant other who would be suffering 
and dying from food, shelter, and medical care. “The fact that a person is 
physically near us, so that we have personal contact with him [sic], may make 
it more likely that we shall assist him, but this does not show that we ought 
to help him rather than another who happens to be further away.”18 If you 
would really save the child and you feel that this is the moral thing to do, 
then you really need to save those who need to be saved based on your 
experiencing their suffering and dying. Although the child may be experienced 
from a close distance, the moral feeling of obligation should not alter if 
the experience of someone in need of being saved comes from a medium 
of communication. The physical distance between your body and their body 
should not play any role in mitigating this feeling since the experience of their 
suffering which results from your perceiving it remains the same. The only 
difference is the medium of perception. With the child you use your eyes, 
with the refugees you use your eyes and another medium such as pictures, 
television, internet and the like. The perception of someone being in need of 
assistance is, essentially, the same. Thus, there is no reason why the moral 
duty should not be felt from the distant Other along with the concomitant 
actions which would entail saving them. 
Robert Brown, and Yiftach Fehige, “Thought Experiments,” The Stanford Encyclopedia 
of Philosophy, September 26, 2019, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/
thought-experiment/. 
17 I am using the term ‘historical’ with the widest possible scope. In this case, ‘history’ can refer 
to past events which can be traced to condition or cause a present situation and its possible 
future developments. For instance, we are presented with a drowning child. A historical 
question for this situation would amount to: What happened for the child to end up drowning?
18 Singer, “Famine, Affluence, and Morality,” 232. 
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Furthering his argumentation, Singer tells us that just because there could 
be others who could provide assistance for those in need, be they drowning 
babies or refugees, it does not make it any less obligatory to us that we should 
help. Our moral obligation should be felt the same and thus propel us to 
action regardless of any other who could also help. Regardless of what others 
are doing, our duty is to save the ones in need.19 Since the distance as physical 
proximity and the amount of other possible helpers should not mitigate our 
dutiful obligation to help the drowning baby or the refugees in East Bengal, 
Singer extends the dutiful obligation to help others no matter where there 
may be. “Given the present conditions in many parts of the world, however, 
it does follow from my argument that we ought, morally, to be working full 
time to relieve great suffering of the sort that occurs as a result of famine or 
other disasters.”20 In this way, if pulling the baby out of the pond would have 
fulfilled the moral obligation in the case of the baby drowning, then for the 
others who are far, the moral duty can be fulfilled by giving money to those 
who can provide the assistance that would save them and thus relieve their 
suffering. In Singer’s words, “the application of the moral conclusion we have 
reached” is the “giving away a great deal of money [which] is the best means 
to this end.”21 And this giving away is not squandering, but, like in the case 
of Bengal, a giving to those “[e]xperts, observers and supervisors, sent out 
by famine relief organizations or permanently stationed famine-prone areas 
[who] can direct our aid to a refugee in Bengal as effectively as we could get 
it to someone in our own block.”22 In simple terms, this would mean giving 
a great deal of money to charities – which are made out of people –who can 
be as effective as we would have been were we to save a drowning child by 
pulling it out of the pond. 
Whereas some people may consider that this giving money to charities 
might not be “the best means to this end” Singer provides two arguments. 
Someone might consider that this is the responsibility of one’s government 
and thus they should not engage in giving what the government should (have) 
be(en) giving. Such thought would waive them from their responsibility. 
Yet, as Singer argues, we cannot establish whether refusing to donate to 
charities would either motivate the government to take up or eschew this 
responsibility. “So, the onus of showing how their refusal will bring about 
government action is on those who refuse to give.”23 As stated earlier, it 
19 For an analysis of what this argument entails in praxis – i.e. the restriction of collective 
action – see Rubenstein, 511-526.
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should be of no concern to us whether any other would (also) engage in the 
same undertaking. Focusing on our duty we should help regardless. 
The second argument for not giving money to private charities as the best 
means to the end of relieving suffering revolves around the idea of population 
control. Arguably, letting people die out of famine keeps resources in a good 
state whereas if the former were saved that would mean spending those 
resources or part of them and thus “fac[ing] starvation in a few years’ time.”24 
However, as Singer underscores, that argument simple points to the fact that 
there needs to be some population control because the limited earth resources 
cannot indefinitely sustain an ever-growing human population; it does not 
negate the moral obligation of helping those suffering and dying of famine.25 
Following these two arguments, which aim to convince us that giving to 
private charities is the best means to the end of being altruistic, as defined 
earlier, Singer proceeds to clarify that this moral conclusion can take place in 
two ways. We can give in two ways. There are two versions of the principle 
“giving as much as we can” which is analogised with all that we could do. 
The stronger version is that we “ought to give until we reach the level of 
marginal utility – that is, the level at which by giving more, I would cause as 
much suffering to myself or my dependents as I would relieve by my gift.”26 
The second one, the moderate one, is the one which is closer to the principle 
of saving unless this saving means sacrificing something of comparable moral 
significance. 
To conclude, it is our moral duty to do all we can to help others and 
“taking our conclusion seriously means acting upon it.”27 And this action is 
an act of charity whereby we give away as much money as we can in order to 
help those who are suffering or dying. It is on this foundation that EA rests: 
Giving money. As we saw earlier, there have been some developments to these 
moral arguments. One such development refers to clarifying what the good is 
and, all the more so, how we can know what we give is as effective as it could 
possibly be. In other words, how can we know that all that we can give can 
have the best possible outcome which should be nothing else than the “most 
good?”28 
24 Ibid., 240.
25 Singer is not very clear here as to whether the starvation refers to the possible descendants 
of those suffering now or a possible starvation for all. Some philosophers who disagree, like 
Garett Hardin, believe that we should not help the poor at all otherwise we would all starve 
sooner rather than if we did not help them at all – cf. Garett Hardin, “Lifeboat Ethics: The Case 
Against Helping the Poor,” Psychology Today, September, 1974, 800-812. 
26 Singer, “Famine, Affluence, and Morality,” 241.
27 Ibid., 242.
28 Singer, The Most Good You Can Do, 7, 9.
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 23/08/2021 05:34:49 |
[ 33 ]
CONATUS • JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY VOLUME 5, ISSUE 2 • 2020
In the further developments of this thinking, the “most good” is articulated 
as the improvement of the world such that there would be less suffering and 
more happiness in it and where people live longer. Effective altruists work in 
materialising these values which are terminologically packed into the phrase 
“saving lives.” The latter, “of course, only ever means extending someone’s 
life” in a way that they are happy and not suffering. Whereas we do not have 
a clear indication of what is the ideal number of years one should live, we 
can risk the hypothesis from the writings of effective altruists that premature 
death would translate into any age of below 70 years old.29 
Our moral obligation to do the most we can to save lives, as defined 
by effective altruists, has also been developed with respect to the action it 
would require to take place. So now, to fulfil our moral duty according to 
the developed EA would entail to (a) choose a career which would allow us 
to make as much money as possible so that we can give as much money as 
possible to charities – what they call “earning to give,”30 (b) choosing causes 
and donating to charities which pursue this cause and which can provide a 
proven track record that they do save lives or have a verified probability of 
being able to do so, and (c) giving body ‘parts’ that we can regenerate31 
and possibly “non-regenerative organ[s]” such as kidneys insofar as they are 
not causing any serious damage endangering our own well-being. All this 
amounts to being altruistic effectively.32 
We have conceptually followed EA and we have also gone all the way 
back to its founding principle as explained by Singer. Let us go back to EA’s 
childhood – after all, if we are to adopt EA it is the abandoned child that we 
first need to rescue from its being drowning. By accepting the assumption that 
Singer set forth earlier, we shall reflect on the analogy that he has attempted. 
Is saving a drowning child instead of getting muddy analogous to saving the 
refugees of East Bengal or any other distant Other? Also, is the act of saving 
the drowning child analogous to giving money to charities?
IV. How much charity shall we give to EA?
We start by reflecting on the thought experiment. If we were to be as 
logically strict as Singer asks to do, then we would struggle to see how this 
drowning child comes easily under the category of suffering and death from 
29 MacAskill, Doing Good Better, 27-29.
30 Singer, The Most Good You Can Do, 39.
31 Ibid., 70.
32 From the point of view of the history of philosophy, these prescriptions do not have any 
structural difference from Comte’s idea of living for others (vivre pour autrui); cf. Auguste 
Comte, The Positive Philosophy, vol. I, trans. Harriet Martineau (London: John Chapman, 
1896), 500-560. 
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lack of food, shelter, and medical care. Since we do not have historical or 
contextual information, this child might have ended up being drowning for 
a million different reasons other than the category which we assumed to be 
bad. Nevertheless, let us wade in this murky logical pond and try to follow 
Singer. Let us give him a free pass for the moment, or as it is usually said, 
let us be charitable to Singer and allow him to make manifest this duty. Let 
us assume that we feel that we ought to wade in and pull out the drowning 
child. 
Singer tells us that when presented with this scenario most people or 
his students would shout out that they would save the child. They feel that 
this is the moral thing to do. However, just because most people would 
agree that saving the child is moral, that does not make it necessarily so. 
This appeal to the majority or to, what amounts to the same, an appeal to 
representationalism, will haunt us until later. For the moment, the point we 
need to raise is that what constitutes morality is traced to a feeling of being 
compelled to have a tendency to act in a particular way when compared to 
alternatives. The thought experiment, as every thought experiment, excludes 
all variables apart from the ones that need to be compared. Let us attempt 
to investigate these variables. According to the thought experiment the 
variables that are analogised in the two cases are:
1. Perception
2. Evaluating badness
3. Feeling moral obligation
4. Providing aid in order to save
[…] if I am walking past a shallow pond and see a child drowning 
in it [perception], I ought [feeling moral obligation] to wade in 
and pull the child out [providing aid in order to save]. This will 
mean getting my clothes muddy, but this is insignificant, while 
the death of the child would presumably be a very bad thing 
[evaluating badness].33
In order for a strict parity between the two cases to obtain we have to secure 
parity for each individual variable between the case of the drowning child 
and the case of the distant Other. Singer has already given us some reasons 
for which perception is analogous in both cases. So far, we have secured the 
parity of perception as an act. However, we have not analogised the content 
33 Singer, “Famine, Affluence, and Morality,” 231. The brackets refer to the variables identified 
in the thought experiment. 
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of perception.34 If the parity of the content of perception does not obtain, then 
the overall parity will fail. If the extension from child to refugees does not 
prove to be analogical, then the further analogy from East Bengal as the distant 
Other to any Other could not pass either. 
There are two issues that make the parity of the content of perception 
difficult to obtain. First, the child is one and the refugees are many. Logically, 
we can say with Heraclitus35 that the one and the many are in the end one – 
so that we can assume logical parity in classes, i.e. class of child and class of 
refugees. We have to assume a logic of classes to make the analogy happen. 
The logical parity can be achieved by thinking of thinking of a class of drowning 
children to be saved and then thinking of a class of refugees to be saved – the 
parity is between a thinking of classes. This, however, goes beyond perception. 
Initially we were asked to think of a perception of a child and then a perception 
of refugees. Yet, the analogy is not between what is thought to be perceived – 
or having been perceived – but of a reworked thought; a thought with classes. 
If the variable of perception is to be kept, as Singer aims to do, then we would 
have to imagine as many children as refugees – that is the meaning of strict 
analogy in all levels. 
Imagine you come across hundreds of children drowning in ponds – or as 
many children as refugees you see on television or whatever else medium: Do 
you still feel the same moral obligation to save all of them? As many as you 
can? Save them all by yourself? Most of us could possibly answer affirmatively 
to the first two questions. Yet, if the scenario had us imagining as many children 
as there were immigrants in East Bengal, then that could have possibly changed 
the dynamics of whether saving all of them would interfere with the sacrifice of 
something of comparable importance. Having more children to save may raise 
the feeling of compulsion to save them but it may equally raise the amount of 
sacrifice – even if this sacrifice was only of time. The passage between the one 
and the many does not secure the non-violation of the principle of sacrificing 
something of comparable importance. And this is the cost of changing from 
perception into a thinking with classes to obtain an analogy.
We are still examining the variable of perception. Singer attempts to 
neutralise the variable of distance in perception in order to obtain the parity. 
Perhaps, Singer assumes that distance is implied only in the case of perceiving 
the refugees. However, there is also distance in the perception of the drowning 
child. The perception of the child is not just a perception of a child; it is a 
34 For the importance of the difference between perception and content of perception see 
Edmund Husserl, On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time (1813-1917), 
trans. John Barnett Brough (Dordrecht: Kuwer Academic Publishers, 1991).
35 For the variations of the ‘one and the many’ see Heraclitus, DK 50, DK 60, DK 106, DK 125, 
and also DK 7, and DK 41.
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perception of a drowning child. Our perception has already been classified 
as ‘child’ and ‘drowning.’ How do we know that the child is drowning? It is 
given by the scenario of course. But to perceive that a child is drowning and to 
know that a child is drowning are two different things. Singer says “see” but 
this ‘seeing’ which should lead to our moral intuition of feeling compelled to 
help would have to be a knowing that this is the case. Here Singer enjoys and 
enjoins the senses of ‘seeing’ in order to neutralise the distance which is always 
implied in perception. Seeing a child drowning in an authentic act of perception 
does not immediately entail knowing that the child is indeed drowning. The 
child could be playing or faking and the like. I can see something which would 
turn out to be something else. The condition of seeing with epistemic import 
requires a particular distance and engagement – not to mention the historical 
context of each event. And this particular distance and engagement cannot 
be secured immediately in the case of an additional medium of perception (i.e. 
tv, internet) which informs us about what is the case.36 Someone suffering and 
dying from lack of food, shelter and medical care may have visual signs that 
provide immediate information about their situation whereas the case of a 
drowning child does not. Strictly logically, analogous perception fails. 
The parity of perception cannot be achieved based on what Singer has given 
us. But let us provide some more charity to his attempt and allow the possibility 
that the perceptions are analogical. The second variable that we identified was 
‘evaluating badness.’ We have already given some charity in order to achieve 
the analogy between the category of drowning and the category of dying out 
of lack of food, shelter and medical care. To make this happen we assumed the 
broader category of dying. However, there is an issue of agency which might 
pose problems in securing the logical parity. For instance, the ‘child’ is a class of 
persons and these persons can vary with respect to their agency and their power 
of acting. We could suppose37 that the child requires help and we know better 
what kind of help to provide in order to save them. But the presupposition 
here is that the child cannot save itself hence our act(ion) is deemed necessary. 
However, the class of refugees may quantify over persons who know what they 
need to do to save their lives. If they could reason like we do, could we not ask 
them what kind of help they need? Would we not be stealing their autonomy as 
reasonable people if we assumed that we know better how to save them?
If we assume a logical parity between ‘children drowning’ and ‘refugees 
dying of hunger,’ then we would be sacrificing the autonomy of refugees 
as follows: First, the categories ‘drowning’ and ‘dying of hunger’ are bad 
36 The present controversy over the development of the Covid-19 virus as an epidemic or 
pandemic is an adequate example of this point. 
37 I use the term ‘suppose’ as we do not have any more historical information about the child 
which would relate to its capabilities. This problem will haunt us again later.
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with respect to the imminent death that they imply. Second, the categories 
‘children’ and ‘refugees’ end up being analogous with respect to not being 
able to avert the condition of badness. Yet, the category ‘refugees’ includes 
or may include both ‘children’ and ‘adults whereas the category ‘children’ 
should exclude ‘adults.’ With Singer’s analogy, however, we could end up 
doing the following: with respect to autonomy of action and reflecting and 
acting responsibly, we would be treating the children as refugees and the 
refugees as children. 
Apart from the moral issue involved in this type of thinking, we shall focus 
on its logical problems. The logical flaw is generated here from an implicit 
use of a metaphor. ‘Pulling the child out of the pond’ is used to arrive to the 
idea of ‘pulling the Other out of their suffering and death.’ But in our case the 
issue is of creating an analogy, a logical parity, not a metaphor. To assume 
that the class of ‘drowning child’ is analogous to the class of ‘refugees dying 
from’ with respect to evaluating the badness of their condition cannot be 
saved that easily unless we provide some more charity to Singer. 
Yet, even with more (logical) charity what we save here will haunt us 
if we look at the type of aid we could provide. To understand this further 
we need to introduce an auxiliary concept, the ‘body.’ The provision of the 
aid in the case of the child was “wading in” and “pulling out” which refer to 
one’s own body. Bodies come into contact. The aid comes from one’s body 
and, more importantly, from the power of one’s body. We agreed with Singer 
that “if it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without 
thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, 
morally, to do it.”38 Now, through the referential opacity of ‘power’ Singer 
moves into suggesting that providing aid as donating money is analogously 
powerful to “wading in” and “pulling out” someone who is drowning.39 But 
such a logical move does not follow. Even if we presuppose that in the end of 
both events people’s lives are saved, one bodily action is not as powerful as 
the other precisely because in the case of donating money more bodies will 
be involved in this saving supplementing the power of wading in and pulling 
out.40 Let us think this in re(-)verse: To punch someone is not necessarily 
38 Singer, “Famine, Affluence, and Morality,” 231; emphasis added. Contrary to Kissel who 
argues that there is “no deep theoretical between EA and anti-capitalism,” we have to note that 
insofar as effective altruists represent power in monetary terms then this representationalism 
would always stumble or stick on the issues of adequacy and thus the possibility of reserves 
and surpluses on which capitalism rests – we shall revisit this point shortly. Joshua Kissel, 
“Effective Altruism and Anti-Capitalism: An Attempt at Reconciliation,” Essays in Philosophy 
18, no. 1 (2017): 19.
39 In the same line of thought, MacAskill conceives of power in terms of the amount of money 
one has in their possession (see Chapter 1, Doing Good Better). 
40 In one of the ways that effective altruists apply their principles is through the Charity ‘Give 
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analogous with having someone hired to punch them. The analogy would 
obtain, if it would, concerning the impact on the receiver i.e. being hurt. The 
ends may be analogous but the events are not. Thus, the logical extension of 
the two scenarios cannot obtain unless we give more charity to bridge this 
logical gap.
V. Giving and taking
So far, we have provided a lot of (logical) charity to Singer to make his 
argument work. But there are other issues which flow from such a logical 
path. Earlier we raised a question concerning the history of the event of the 
drowning child. For the class of persons in East Bengal we get a glimpse of 
the history through the very adjective ‘refugees.’ The reason for which we 
inquired into the history or the context for the drowning child is because we 
wanted to explore whether this could possibly affect our evaluation of the 
situation and, thus, our moral intuition and, finally, our motivation to act. 
In the paper where the drowning child first appears, Singer avowed that the 
moral obligation to help comes as an entailment of one’s valuing that dying 
of lack of food, shelter, and medical care is bad. This evaluation comes from 
an assumption and this assumption harbours a belief in that things can be bad 
or good in themselves, objectively. In his later writings, Singer does not claim 
that this is an assumption but a truth and that “the eternal truths of reason can 
generate feelings in all human beings.”41 Following Henry Sidgwick, Singer 
argues that there are “self-evident fundamental moral principles, or axioms, 
which we grasp through our reasoning capacity.”42 One such axiom is that 
everyone’s good, or let us say well-being, is of equal importance and thus 
we are bound to regard each other’s well-being as our own. It is thus reason 
that plays a generating force for acting for the well-being of the Other. 
Supposedly, reason can motivate us to help the other. Yet, the scenario that 
Singer proposed initially was not meant to show how reason works or should 
work in the case of the drowning child but how there is a moral intuition 
generated at the instance of ‘seeing’ someone dying. The problem that Singer 
tries to solve is that of being motivated to help regardless if it is judged to 
be the moral thing to do. 
Directly’ which transfers the donated money directly to those whom they consider in need. 
Even in this case, the body-to-body action of wading in and pulling out is still not analogous 
with handing in money physically or virtually through an electronic transfer. The medium which 
intervenes between the bodies, in this case money, through which everything is represented, 
is what shatters a strict analogy. It is also this medium which allows to advance an argument 
which gives the impression that by a single click on the computer you can save lives. 
41 Singer, The Most Good You Can Do, 81.
42 Ibid. 
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Before we proceed into the issue of motivation we shall pause and 
reflect a bit on this philosophical idea of objectivity in what is good. This 
view is often called “objectivity in ethics” or “moral realism-universalism.” 
The opposing view to realism would be relativism, meaning that there are no 
truths about right or wrong. A moral intuition of right or wrong is equated 
with a judgement since we are in the realm of evaluating something. In 
this case, there are moral judgements which can be true or false. Reason 
is that which can help us reach those fundamental moral truths. However, 
this creates a circularity. If reason is what can lead us to moral truth then 
what is moral truth? Obviously that which is coming from reason, that 
is, reasonable. Unless we fall into a vicious regress we would have to say 
that truth here is also the good. And what is good? That which reason 
allows us to grasp. As we shall shortly explore, unless we presuppose some 
ultimate end or a regulating idea, truth and reason do not make much sense 
in explicating each other.43 Singer, who espouses Darwin’s evolutionary 
theory of being, tries to show that helping others is a fundamentally true 
judgment and also consonant with the theory of evolution which poses 
as an end one’s own survival and the perpetuation of the species.44 This 
is also the way that other philosophers who espouse moral universalism 
attempt to conceptually fund their thoughts. The argument is essentially 
transcendental. For instance, as Rachels tells us: “There is a general point 
here, namely, that there are some moral rules that all societies must embrace, 
because those rules are necessary for society to exist.”45 Unless there is 
universality of how cultures act in some fundamental respects, cultures 
would not have existed in time. What this transcendental thinking, however, 
does not reveal is why we, be it singularly or collectively, should exist or 
survive. For whatever reason, I can inquire into the reason of existence and 
I cannot find any compelling argument of why I, as a person who reasons, 
should exist – whether I evolved or was created. And this is why I should 
exist does not only refer to my origins but also to my purpose in life. Why 
is this relevant to our discussion? It is relevant because Singer admits that 
43 See Kant’s First Critique. For reason to work an ens realissimum is required – be it God or any 
other Ultimate End as regulating idea. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman 
Kemp Smith (London: MacMillan and Co., 1929). 
44 See Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek, and Peter Singer, “The Objectivity of Ethics and the Unity of 
Practical Reason,” Ethics, 1, no. 10 (2012): 9-31. It is based on this regulating idea of ‘survival’ 
and ‘perpetuation of the species’ that Comte and contemporary neurobiologists are trying to 
make a case about humans’ being essentially altruistic. 
45 James Rachels, The Elements of Moral Philosophy (New York: Random House, 2012), 24; 
original emphasis. There is a difference between wanting to live and having to live. We do not 
have to live; there is no necessity in living. One can always committ suicide. The latter, even if 
undesirable, is within our power.
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surviving without meaning, that is, purpose in life, does not make much 
sense and is “a self-defeating enterprise.”46 Perhaps, evolution is an effect 
of having a meaningful life and not the cause of it. It is not that we all have 
reason that we perpetuate our species, but we perpetuate our species as a 
result of creating a reason, a purpose in life which motivates us to go on. 
According to Singer in his later effective altruist writings, in the natural 
development of his arguments, securing the well-being of the Other does 
not seem to be propelled exclusively by a mandate of reason, nor by an 
immediate intuitive compulsion but of a personal pursuit of happiness which 
would come about by creating a meaningful life. And this meaning means 
having a purpose since we “live in a time when many people experience their 
lives as empty and lacking in fulfilment.”47 In this case, however, helping the 
Other does not come from the well-being of the Other being the reason as 
an end in itself, but instead it is a personal reason to have a meaningful life. 
Ethics “offer a solution. An ethical life is one in which we identify ourselves 
with other, larger, goals thereby giving meaning to our lives.”48 From 
reason we now move to “the need” of finding “meaning and fulfillment 
in life” and thus many people turn to effective altruism as a way of giving 
their lives a purpose it would not otherwise have.”49 Reason alone cannot 
motivate the enterprise, the business for producing the well-being of the 
Other; it cannot find, fund, and found a (foundational) ground to help the 
Other unless it attempts a detour whereby it gives self-satisfaction – from a 
universal reason we pass into a personal reason. What we have here, then, is 
not a need but a desire for a meaningful life which is fulfilled by helping the 
Other. And for this desire to be fulfilled the Other must be in need of help. 
Does this mean that the Other must be constantly in need of help for us to 
keep beli(e)ving in a meaningful life (as effective altruists)?50 
To explore this hypothesis we would need to go back to the semantic 
ambivalence of the parameter (4) of providing aid. In the case of the drowning 
child, the provision of aid is wading in and pulling out. It happens once with 
one’s body. Once again, there is no ‘again’ or a gain in saving the child. It 
happens once for the child itself and not for us – hapax. The child is saved 
46 Peter Singer, “The Drowning Child and the Expanding Circle,” in The Effective Altruism 




49 Singer, The Most Good You Can Do, 91, 47. 
50 From the philosophy of psychoanalysis, this would be an instance of projection and 
masochism with respect to having a meaning on the condition of the exploitation of the Other 
and the giving of charity both as projection and as a reaction formation to justify the guilt of 
the exploitation. 
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from imminent death and then it is on its own.51 In the case of the Other 
who dies of poverty, lack of shelter or medical care, could we say something 
analogous? It is right at this moment that the history of each scenario becomes 
important concerning the provision of aid. If we were to do all that is in our 
power to wade in and pull out the Other from imminent death coming from 
poverty, lack of shelter and lack of medical care what would that mean? For 
the latter two, the lack already sign posts us their fulfillment. We can provide 
shelter and medical care. Effective altruists do argue about that and they also 
seek to realise it – there is no doubt about that. 
But what about poverty? What is the lack that is fundamentally implied in 
poverty? Earlier we followed Singer in thinking that poverty relates to the lack 
of food. We ought to help those who die of famine. But famine and poverty in 
the developments of EA are translated in terms of money. Poverty is represented 
in monetary terms presupposing a capitalist economy. McAskill writes:
For almost all of human history – from the evolution of Homo 
sapiens two hundred thousand years ago until the Industrial 
Revolution 250 years ago – the average income across all 
countries was the equivalent of two dollars per day or less. Even 
now, more than half of the world still lives on four dollars per day 
or less. Yet, through some outstanding stroke of luck, we have 
found ourselves as the inheritors of the most astonishing period 
of economic growth the world has ever seen, while a significant 
proportion of people stay as poor as they have ever been.52
I let the reader decide how much ‘luck’ has to do with the ‘lack’ of food as 
a result of the building of our colonial empires; how much ‘luck’ and ‘lack’ 
is involved in slavery, genocide and ethno-cleansing which have made us, 
the western world, the inheritors of the abundance that MacAskill describes. 
Instead, I would like to underscore how effective altruists do not reflect on 
their presupposition that poverty should be construed in capitalist terms.
51 This point may raise concerns as to the extent to which a child can make it on its own. That 
concern would require a clear conceptualisation of what we mean by ‘child.’ See Philippe Aries, 
Centuries of Childhood: A Social History of Family Life (New York: Random House, 1965). 
Obviously, a newborn baby or a baby without certain developed capacities cannot. Yet, once 
certain capacities are developed a child as a young human being could do surprising things for 
their survival. See John Eekelaar, “The Emergence of Children’s Rights,” Oxford Journal of Legal 
Studies 6, no. 2 (1986): 161-182, or the confessions of Jean Gennet in his various works. But 
even if one adheres to a strong paternalism, an individual of a certain age can be knowingly 
independent in terms of avoiding being drown in ponds. I thank an anonymous reviewer for 
allowing me to think this further. 
52 MacAskill, Doing Good Better, 20. 
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As MacAskill says, when it comes “to helping others, being unreflective 
means being ineffective.”53 It is not the case that poverty, for almost all 
of human history, was a matter of income and money. Plato for, instance, 
describes poverty (πενία) as aporia (ἀπορία): “ἡ οὖν Πενία ἐπιβουλεύουσα 
διὰ τὴν αὑτῆς ἀπορίαν παιδίον ποιήσασθαι ἐκ τοῦ Πόρου.”54 And aporia, as 
a quick semantic and etymological analysis would suggest, relates to the 
inability to move – ultimately to what the body cannot do.55 Because we take 
the current capitalistic system of exchanging goods for granted, we now think 
that the poor is the one who does not earn beyond a numerical monetary 
threshold in a capitalist setting. The poor, then, are not the ones who are not 
able to sustain themselves foodwise, through the power of their bodies, but 
the ones who cannot participate in the current system of exchanging goods 
effectively so as to be able to have food or whatever else. 
Taking such representations for granted will not allow EA to wade in and 
pull out the poor from poverty but will always be limited in trying “to end the 
extreme poverty.”56 Would that mean that there should always be poverty? 
Why should there always be poverty? Whereas MacAskill seems to neglect the 
philosophical and historical developments of representing poverty, Singer takes 
for granted that altruism should be defined within the capitalist setting: “Like 
it or not, for the foreseeable future we seem to be stuck with some variety of 
capitalism, and along with it come markets in stocks, bonds, and commodities.”57 
Since EA sticks to capitalism, EA is always going to be ineffective since it 
does not reflect on the phenomenon of poverty and the development of its 
representation. If we really were to be altruistic (effectively), then we should 
realise Singer’s analogy differently by reflecting on how to wade in and pull 
out the other from poverty and not just from the way poverty is represented 
within a capitalist setting.58 But, perhaps, that requires another economy, an 
53 Ibid., 7.
54 For the original text see Plato, Symposium, 203b. Keeping the original text in Greek is vital 
to apprehend the semantic nuances between poros-aporia which can be lost in translations 
(cf. “Then Penia, because she herself had no resource, thought of a scheme to have a child by 
Poros” Plato, “Symposium,” in Plato: The Symposium, eds. M.C. Howatson and Frisbee C. C. 
Sheffield (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 39. 
55 Even when ‘aporia’ is used by Aristotle to describe a noetic impasse, the explication used 
is always with reference to the body – Cf. Thomas Aquinas who translates and comments on 
Aristotle’s aporia: “For just as one whose feet are tied cannot move forward on an earthly 
road, in a similar way one who is puzzled, and whose mind is bound, as it were, cannot move 
forward on the road of speculative knowledge.” Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle’s 
Metaphysics, 1: 339.
56 MacAskill, Doing Good Better, 105. My emphasis.
57 Singer, The Most Good You Can Do, 50.
58 EA cannot be saved just by making some fine tunings in their methods or their causes as 
Gabriel tries to show; see Iason Gabriel, “Effective Altruism and Its Critics,” Journal of Applied 
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economy which would not be charitable to sustaining the condition of poverty 
as, arguably, takes place in capitalism. Such economy would not make an 
allowance, would not allow the poor to exist as capitalism does. It would not 
aim to eradicate extreme poverty but, rather, it would aim at not allowing the 
existence of the poor or the aporous. But such a possibility requires a thinking 
where poverty is not represented in monetary terms, a representation which has 
created the opacities we have explored.
However, effective altruists are not likely to promote such a passage 
precisely because it cannot be quantified in the epistemic terms they accept 
in order to be convinced about its importance.59 We are, thus, stuck with a 
representation of poverty in monetary terms and this representation allows 
only a thinking of the eradication of a type of poverty and not the eradication 
of poverty itself. This means that by being charitable to this (representation 
of) poverty we sustain it. Just as, in this paper so far, we have been giving 
representational charity to EA in terms of logically bridging their argument 
without being able to offer us a passage to altruism, so too, giving monetary 
charity within a system which sustains the existence of those who have and 
those who have not, i.e. capitalism, not only is not effective altruism, it is 
neither authentically altruistic. If poverty did not take place would we need to 
give to charity? What would the meaning of giving to charity be if there was 
no poverty? With poverty represented with(in) capitalism, charity becomes its 
crutch. Charity is not like wading in and pulling out someone from a drowning 
pond, but maybe like throwing a life jacket, a life preserver. Preserving the life of 
the poor in the conditions that they are found also preserves the conditions which 
endangered them in the first place; it is not saving them from these conditions. 
Following EA which relies so much in giving monetary charity within a capitalist 
setting we do, in one sense, sacrifice something of comparable importance: 
the possibility of trying to authentically free the poor from poverty.60 And, 
if we take Singer to the letter that EA offers a purpose in life, as we explored 
earlier, then that would mean that our meaningful lives in EA would require the 
sacrifice of the poor’s possibility to authentically overcome poverty. 
Philosophy 34, no. 4 (2017): 457-473. Analogically, just rearranging furniture would not do 
if our aim is an authentic restructuring. Since the philosophical-theoretical axiomatic principles 
are problematic, any realization of them, be it adequate or, per impossibile, perfect, would 
entail these philosophical-theoretical problems, in one way or another. 
59 One could even risk here the hypothesis that the epistemic criteria set forth by EA are complicit 
with the political system in which they emerged. As Srinivasan aptly put it: “capitalism, as 
always, produces the means of its own correction, and effective altruism is just the latest 
instance.” Srinivasan, 6.
60 For a similar critique see Matthew Snow, “Against Charity,” Jacobin, August 25, 2015, 
https://www.jacobinmag.com/2015/08/peter-singer-charity-effective-altruism/. 
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VI. Epilogue
With EA we see how moralising about those in need in monetary representational 
terms ends up at their expense. For us to be charitable we need those who are in 
need of such charity utterly neglecting how they came to be poor – the refugees 
of Bengal were the effect of post-colonial war not just some outstanding stroke 
of luck. It seems that this altruism is not motivated by the Other per se, but by 
our desire to have a purposeful life as we saw with Singer earlier. In one sense, 
the Other is sacrificing themselves for us. Some altruism does occur but not only 
from us but for us as well. 
As we saw earlier, Singer admitted that if one does not believe that such 
suffering and death are bad then his reasoning will not appeal to them and they 
“need read no further.”61 This prescription seems a bit troubling. It allows for an 
exclusion of those who would not share Singer’s presuppositions. Singer makes no 
effort of trying to understand why some might disagree with his assumption. An 
authentic altruism would start right here, that is, in the attempt to understand the 
Other rather than by imposing our own beliefs, our values, and, with capitalism, 
our ways of life on them. The problem with EA is not only that is ineffective but 
the fact that it is funded by a philosophy which has little to do, which in Latin 
means give, when it comes to helping the Other authentically, without reserve.
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